This paper assesses corruption levels and trends among countries in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), based on data from several sources that are both widely used and cover most or all countries in the region. Data from firm surveys tend to show improvement in most types of administrative corruption, but little change in "state capture," in the region. Broader, subjective corruption indicators tend to show somewhat greater improvement in ECA than in non-ECA countries on average. A "primer on corruption indicators" discusses definitional and methodological differences among data sources that may account in large part for the apparently conflicting messages they often provide. This discussion concludes that depending on one's purpose, it may be more appropriate to use data from a single source rather than a composite index, because of the loss of conceptual precision in aggregation. A second conclusion is that the gains in statistical "precision" from aggregating sources of corruption data likely are far more modest than often claimed, because of interdependence among data sources. The range of detailed corruption measures available in firm surveys are exploited to show that broad, perceptions-based corruption assessments appear to measure primarily administrative corruption, despite their stated criteria placing great weight on "state capture." Finally, the paper emphasizes the need for scaling up data initiatives to fill significant gaps between our conceptual definitions of corruption and the operational definition embodied in the existing measures.
Introduction
This paper assesses corruption levels and trends among countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region, based on data from several sources that are both widely used and cover most or all countries in the region. It is impossible to understand this evidence, however, without first examining in some detail the properties of the corruption indicators themselves.
The paper thus serves the second purpose of critiquing the existing cross-country measures of corruption. The ECA region is most appropriate for this purpose, because it has the richest set of available data on corruption.
Because the various data sources are not always in agreement, we examine definitional and methodological issues in a "primer on corruption indicators" before reporting evidence on levels and trends. Section 2 discusses definitional and methodological differences among data sources that may account in large part for the apparently conflicting messages they often provide. Section 3 assesses claims that the solution to disagreement among sources is to aggregate them, on the assumption that they collectively are more informative than is any single source. There are two major arguments in this section. First, depending on one's purpose, it may be more appropriate to use a single source than an aggregate, because of the loss of conceptual precision in aggregation. Second, the gains in statistical "precision" from aggregating sources of corruption data likely are far more modest than often claimed, because of interdependence among data sources. Section 4 presents evidence from the various data sources on corruption trends in the ECA region. Data from firm surveys, including the BEEPS and the World Economic Forum's (WEF) survey of business executives, tend to show improvement in most types of administrative corruption, but little change in "state capture," in the region. The broader, subjective indicators tend to show somewhat greater improvement in ECA than in non-ECA countries on average. Sources disagree markedly other on which ECA countries have improved and which have not, but in general their respective rankings are converging, so in that sense the assessments are not inconsistent. The range of corruption measures available in the BEEPS and WEF are exploited in section 5 to show that broad, perceptions-based corruption assessments appear to measure primarily administrative corruption, despite their stated criteria placing great weight on "state capture." Section 6 briefly summarizes the findings, and calls for scaling up data initiatives to fill significant gaps between our conceptual definitions of corruption and the operational definition embodied in the existing measures.
Properties of Corruption Indicators
There are numerous definitions of corruption in the academic literature and among donor agencies. Most of these definitions are quite broad, and often somewhat vague. Transparency International's definition, "the misuse of entrusted power for private gain," is representative. 1 Often, the term "misuse" or "abuse" is further defined to apply only to illegal actions. Accepting TI's brief conceptual definition, "corruption" can be disaggregated along many dimensions:
• By level of political system (central government, provincial, municipal) , roughly corresponding to the terms "petty" and "grand" corruption;
• By purpose of the improper actions: to influence the content of laws and rules ("state capture") or to influence their implementation ("administrative corruption");
• By the actors involved in the corrupt transaction: various combinations of firms, households, and public officials;
• By characteristics of a particular set of actors, for example bribes required for large v. small firms, or for rich v. poor households;
• By administrative agency/function: tax and customs, business licenses, inspections, utility connections, courts, etc.
• By incidence or magnitude of bribes, or by the uncertainty they create for businesses and households.
Regardless of one's preferred conceptual definition, the choice of measurement techniques from a limited set of feasible alternatives inevitably produces an implicit definition that may differ substantially from one's ideal. Any two alternative assessment methodologies inevitably will measure a different (if unknown) mix of these various dimensions of corruption.
For example, what weight should be given to state and local government when assessing "corruption" for the United States? Should states be weighted equally, or on the basis of population or gross state product? Should dispersion, and mobility of firms and households be taken into account? 2 These sorts of questions typically are not explicitly answered in the methodology of existing country-level indicators. Table 1 summarizes the various methods for generating country-level corruption measures, which have been applied to a large number of countries.
The strength of nationally-representative surveys of firms or households is in measuring the incidence of corrupt behaviors encountered by users of government services. In general this approach tends to emphasize administrative corruption. However, firm surveys can measure some aspects of state capture, by including questions about improper influence over laws and regulations affecting business. Surveying firms and households may not be a very useful way of assessing the prevalence of corrupt transactions occurring entirely within the state, for example when politicians bribe bureaucrats. Many types of conflicts of interest also are not easily captured by firm surveys, for example equity stakes of public officials or promises to them of future employment (World Bank, 2000) .
The EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a nationally-representative survey of business firms measuring corruption across countries in the ECA region, and over time. It has covered the full region, in each of three survey waves : 1999, 2002 and 2005 . These surveys include questions not only on corruptionrelated issues, but also on many other aspects of the investment climate, not addressed in this paper. Similar enterprise surveys have been conducted by the World Bank in many countries in other regions, but they are done on a country-by-country basis rather than on a region-wide every three years as with BEEPS. 3 The World Economic Forum's (WEF) "Executive Opinion Survey" is another crosscountry survey of firm managers. In the 2005 survey, a total of 10,993 responses were received, ranging from 22 for Mauritius to 473 for Russia. Cross-country rankings on several corruption questions (see Appendix B5) from this survey are published for 117 countries in the WEF's annual Global Competitiveness Report (Lopez-Claros, Porter and Schwab, 2005) . Ratings are computed as the simple average of all executives' responses. The IMD uses a nearly identical methodology, but using somewhat different survey questions, in its World Competitiveness
Yearbook (IMD, 2005) . The IMD covers many fewer countries than the WEF survey, and discloses less information on the size and composition of its sample of executives in each country.
The WEF and IMD executive opinion surveys differ from the BEEPS (and the World Bank's other investment climate surveys) in several important respects. First, the sample in each country is selected with a preference for executives with international experience, who tend to be from larger and exporting firms). Second, the questions are designed to elicit "the expert opinions of business leaders" on corruption and other issues, and focus much less than BEEPS on firms' experiences. Third, the WEF and IMD surveys are designed solely to produce country- Gallup International (including the GCB) cover only urban households in many countries.
Unlike the BEEPS, results from the WVS and regional "Barometer" surveys are made public only with long lags, limiting their value in diagnosing problems and designing policy responses.
"Expert" assessments of corruption have been most widely used for comparisons across countries and over time. There are important and often-neglected differences among them, with potentially important implications for what they are measuring. First, they differ in the degree of "centralization" of the assessments. The "centralized" type is exemplified by Nations in Transit (NIT) and by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Corruption ratings from these sources are informed by a network of correspondents with country-specific expertise, but the final ratings are determined centrally by a very small number of people.
In the "decentralized" type, views are solicited from experts only for countries in which accompany the quantitative ratings. The CPIA publishes its detailed assessment criteria on a public web site, and generates reasonably detailed narratives justifying the ratings, but neither the ratings nor the justifications are released outside the Bank. 7 Sources that are more transparent and accountability, as reflected by the availability of detailed assessment criteria and justifications for ratings of each country, arguably will tend to be more accurate in their assessments. At a minimum, one can debate meaningfully the appropriateness of the rating and the validity of the methods and information underlying them. Where definitions are brief, vague, and broad, and ratings are not accompanied by justifications for each country, such debate is impossible.
Corruption indicators differ -sometimes within a single source -in attempting to assess:
• the relative incidence of corrupt transactions
• the impact of corruption on business
• the existence of government and other mechanisms believed to affect the prevalence of those transactions.
The ICRG is an example of the first type (see criteria in appendix B4), while the NIT is an example of the last (appendix B2 In principle, the CPIA has fixed, so can be used to assess progress over time.
In practice, however, the criteria are revised at least slightly every two or three years; there is also some skepticism regarding possible "grade inflation" in the ratings over time.
Improvements in methods as well as in content sometimes come at the expense of over-time comparability. The WEF admirably aims to increase the response rate to its Executive Opinion Survey, which should make the sample more representative and therefore the data more accurate. 12 Suppose executives with the strongest opinions are the most likely to respond, and that strong opinions tend to be unfavorable. Then an increase in the response rate from one year to the next will reduce the negative bias, but the year-on-year change will be biased upward. 13 Alternatively, suppose some WEF partner institutes selecting the in-country samples are affiliated with the government and have an interest in producing favorable results. Then ratings would be biased downward at a point in time. Pressure from the WEF to increase sample sizes could produce a downward bias in year-to-year changes, as the partner institutes run out of reliably-favorable executives to survey and must include executives who are more likely to be unfavorable in their responses.
Corruption Indicators Aggregated From Multiple Sources
There are at least three possible justifications for constructing a single corruption index from multiple distinct sources of corruption indicators. The first motive emphasizes substantive content: individual indicators, or even several indicators from an individual source such as the BEEPS, may be defined too narrowly for some purposes; e.g. no matter how many corruption indicators one aggregates from the BEEPS, it still captures only corrupt interactions between firms and public officials. The second motive emphasizes reduction in measurement error.
Given the obvious difficulties in measuring corruption, any one source is likely to be highly inaccurate. However, if errors in measurement are largely independent across sources, the errors will tend to cancel out when data are aggregated from multiple sources. The third motive is to cover a larger number of countries, as sources do not fully overlap 14 nor does any one subsume all others in its coverage across countries.
The second and third motives were responsible for the creation of Transparency
International's widely-cited "Corruption Perceptions Index," and subsequently WBI's "Control of Corruption" index (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005) . Although the statistical methods vary somewhat, both of these indexes standardize corruption indicators from numerous sources to place them on a comparable scale, and take an average (unweighted for TI, weighted for WBI) of all available indicators for each country. Missing data on any indicator for a given country are in effect imputed as the average of all indicator values for which data are available for the country. By this procedure, an index value can be computed for any country with data available from even one of the many sources used.
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The original purpose for the TI index was to raise awareness of corruption, and to provide researchers with better data for analyzing the causes and consequences of corruption. It has been 14 Some sources do not overlap at all in country coverage, for example the UNECA's African Governance Indicators and Nations in Transit. 15 TI's "official" index on its web site lists only countries for which three or more data sources were available. The web site of Johan Lambsdorff (the father of TI's index, and indirectly of WBI's index) lists index values for all countries with available data on one or more sources. See http://www.icgg.org/corruption.index.html spectacularly successful in achieving these goals. The WBI index, first appearing about five years after the introduction of TI's index, was intended by its authors to improve and expand on TI is several ways. First, the WBI index provides a value for any country with data available from even one source. Second, it incorporates data from more sources, as TI rejects several sources (including the ICRG) on various grounds (Lambsdorff, 2005a) . Third, using many of the same sources WBI constructs five other broad "governance" indexes. 16 Fourth, it weights available sources differently, in contrast to TI's equal weighting of available sources for each country. 17 Finally, WBI attempts to improve on TI's treatment of statistical uncertainty. While TI lists number of sources, and the range and standard deviation among sources, WBI computes a "standard error" as an indicator of uncertainty accompanying each point estimate. These standard errors are lower, other things equal, when more sources are available and when the level of agreement among those sources is greater.
For the consciousness-raising and research purposes that inspired these aggregate indexes, the basic logic behind them is sound. Measurement error is likely to be reduced somewhat by combining data from multiple sources. Moreover, the expansive definition of corruption implied by aggregation was a virtue for TI's and the World Bank's consciousnessraising agendas, and for research demonstrating that corruption is inimical to economic performance.
The limitations of these aggregate indexes are often neglected by data users, however.
Some of these limitations are common to the broad corruption measures from individual sources such as ICRG, NIT or CPIA; other limitations are associated with the process of aggregation.
Transparency in construction
If any component of an aggregate index is constructed in an opaque manner, the Although both TI and WBI provide thorough explanations of their aggregation methodology, replication of the indexes by independent analysts would be costly, particularly as the number of sources used has expanded over the years. Some of the sources are available only to paying subscribers or members, and some are not publicly available at all (e.g. the CPIA used in WBI's index).
Conceptual imprecision, uncertainty and inconsistency
The TI and WBI indexes by construction are even more conceptually imprecise than the broadly-defined ICRG, NIT and CPIA indicators, and even more conceptually uncertain: the uncertainty in how criteria are weighted is multiplied n aggregation. Unlike those sourcespecific properties, the TI and WBI indexes each suffer from having variable ( designed to maximize the number of countries covered by the index.
Tracking Changes Over Time
The standardization procedure used to place different indicators on a common scale precludes the ability to track changes meaningfully over time. The WBI index, for example, is constructed to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for each year the index is provided (1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004 The above method corrects only for changes in country coverage however, and not for year-to-year changes in the underlying data sources and indicators. Even setting aside expanded country coverage, changes from one year to the next in a country's ratings (or rankings) on TI or WBI could be driven purely by the addition of a new source to the index, or by the subtraction of an outdated one. An increase of (say) ½ point on TI surely would be a more convincing indication of actual improvement if it reflects more favorable assessments from a given set of sources from one year to the next, rather than from dropping an unfavorable source or adding a favorable one. To determine whether a ratings change is caused by the former or the latter, one must go to the individual data sources.
Interdependence of Sources
Intuitively, if several sources assess a country more favorably in year 2 than in year 1, we can more confidently infer that an actual improvement occurred. This intuition is valid only to the extent that different sources represent independent judgments. In classifying which countries have improved or worsened to a "statistically significant" degree over time, both WBI and TI assume that assessments from each source are fully independent. Many of the sources used clearly do not reflect fully independent assessments, however. The CPIA process, particularly at the network review stage, takes into account data from many of the expert assessments and firm surveys, and adjusts many ratings that appear inconsistent with those other assessments. Some of the expert ratings used in TI and WBI acknowledge consulting each others' ratings, and adjusting ratings for some "outliers." Lambsdorff (2005b) notes that the EIU provides little information on definition or methodology for its corruption rating (available only to paying subscribers). He later shows that the EIU ratings are strongly related to lagged, but not contemporaneous WEF corruption ratings. He neglects to point out, however, that the simplest explanation for this pattern is that the EIU assessments may systematically incorporate the most recently available WEF ratings.
In general, firm and household surveys can be expected to represent fully independent judgments, in contrast to most expert assessments. Most respondents in business surveys are unlikely to know the TI ratings for the country in which they operate, and even if they did that knowledge is unlikely to influence much their response to a question about what share of their firms' revenues are paid in bribes. The WEF's "Executive Opinion Survey" is problematic in several respects, however. First, the sample of executives is deliberately chosen to elicit the views of "business leaders" with extensive international experience. These executives are more likely than those in the BEEPS to be aware of the TI and other cross-country ratings. Second, WEF's questions deliberately are phrased in such a way that respondents will "compare their own environment to a world standard, rather than thinking in national terms." Some respondents may therefore consult other cross-country rankings in order to provide more "accurate"
responses. 19 Third, the WEF and IMD both implement similar executive surveys, with samples selected by "partner institutes." The WEF and IMD share many of the same partner institutes, so many of the same executives are likely to be included in both sets of surveys.
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It is impossible to determine quantitatively the degree of interdependence among sources used in TI and WBI. Many of the cross-country or over-time differences they classify as "statistically significant" probably would not be if the appropriate corrections for interdependence could be made.
This unknown but substantial degree of interdependence among sources also obviates any claims regarding the "precision" of estimates. Other things equal, one can have more confidence in a rating based on 9 sources than on a rating for another country based on only 3 sources. It is also important however to identify the sources and to consider the likely degree of interdependence among them. Iceland's 2002 TI index is computed from six sources, which at first glance appears impressively diverse. However, none of them are truly independent: three of These characteristics of the WEF data are responsible for our classifying it as an "expert assessment" rather than as a nationally representative firm survey in Table 1 . 20 For IMD "Partner Institutes" see http://www02.imd.ch/wcc/partner/. For WEF see http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Competitiveness+Programme%5CPartner+Institutes. These two organizations jointly published the "World Competitiveness Report" from 1989 through 1995, but went their separate ways in 1996, with the WEF publishing the "Global Competitiveness Report" and the IMD publishing the "World Competitiveness Yearbook." country so tiny must be very high. Iceland in TI is an extreme example of interdependence, but the problem in more moderate form is endemic to both TI and WBI. Any claims regarding the precise estimation of the degree of imprecision in corruption estimates therefore cannot be substantiated.
The Choice of Weights in Aggregation
Simplicity, objectivity, transparency and replicability of index construction all argue for this choice of equal weighting. On the other hand, if there is strong reason to believe some sources are more accurate than others, that could justify giving the more accurate greater weight than the less accurate. The TI index weights each of its sources equally. There is a caveat, however: the three most recent WEF and IMD surveys are each included as a separate source.
The WEF surveys collectively receive triple the weight given to (say) the EIU or the WMRC.
The WBI index attempts to enhance accuracy by weighting some sources more heavily than others. Specifically, the sources that tend to be more highly correlated with the other sources are given greater weight, with the precise weights determined objectively by (a variant of) principal components analysis. The assumption is that if sources are independent of each other, a source that agrees less with the others is a less accurate measure of corruption -whether due to pure measurement error (the source is deficient in measuring what it purports to measure) or due to extraneous content (e.g. if a source's assessment criteria include factors other than corruption. 21 When the reality of interdependence of sources is recognized, the rationale for such a procedure is undermined. If high correlations among expert assessments are driven by the fact that they consult each other's ratings, agreement among them is a dubious proxy for accuracy. A truly independent source is likely to appear inaccurate; using different information or a different methodology, it is less likely to generate ratings that agree with all of the interdependent sources.
The BEEPS illustrates this problem well. In the WBI index it receives little weight, while Nations in Transit (covering mostly the same countries) receiving enormous weight. As one "expert"-based source among many in the index, it is unsurprising that it tends to be more highly correlated than a firm survey with most other sources. The entire premise of the WBI index, and its "standard errors," is that more information -meaning more sources -produces more accurate and reliable estimates. However, the addition of another expert-based source, that consults its competitors' ratings, can actually reduce accuracy, by lowering the weight of truly independent information in the index.
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The availability of the aggregated indexes themselves can aggravate these problems.
Some expert-based sources providing broad assessments of corruption may buy the premise of TI and WBI that more information is better, and consult those aggregates as an informational shortcut. The ICRG publishes monthly data on corruption, and in most months very few ratings changes occur. September to October 2001 is typical, with only a single ½ point change, for
Switzerland. From October to November, however, 47 ratings were reduced and 10 increased.
Such a dramatic reassessment had not occurred in the ICRG either before (dating back to 1984)
or since. As shown in Figure 1 , the month-to-month correlations in ICRG always exceed .99, but fell to .88 in November 2001. Although the ICRG has not responded to repeated requests for an explanation for this break in the data, there is some evidence that ratings were re-adjusted to conform much more closely to TI's ranking. As shown in Figure 1, There are alternative, more plausible proxies for accuracy that could be used in assigning differential weights in index construction. For example:
• Weight more heavily those sources with more extensive publicly available documentation, particularly regarding assessment criteria and methodology, and detailed justifications. Nations in Transit would thereby receive a greater weight than EIU.
• Weight more heavily those sources that represent truly independent assessments.
The BEEPS would thereby receive a greater weight than WEF or ICRG.
• Among survey sources, weight more heavily those with larger and more nationally representative samples, and those that include more questions on corruption.
• Weight indicators based on conceptual grounds; e.g. if an equal mix of administrative corruption and "state capture" is desired but most available indicators pertain to the former, weight more heavily those that pertain to the latter.
• Treat expert assessments collectively as a single source, with each weighted equally. Do the same for firm surveys, and for household surveys. Assign onethird weight to each of these three categories of sources.
A disadvantage to most of these weighting schemes is that weights would be determined subjectively, in contrast to the objectively-determined weights in the WBI methodology. The larger point is that no one of these weighting choices is likely to be the most appropriate for all purposes to which an aggregate index might be applied. Greater public access to the underlying data used in the TI and WBI indexes, along with better information on how those underlying data are generated, would permit data users to customize their own indexes more appropriate to their own purposes.
Levels and Trends in Corruption for ECA Countries
24 Surowiecki (2004) makes an analogous argument that more information of the wrong kind can contribute to stock market bubbles and crashes. The advent of cable television and the Internet, including particularly CNBC, "magnified the dependent nature of the stock market because it bombarded investors with news about what other investors were thinking." A "herd mentality becomes endemic" as investors cease to make independent judgments about asset values, and the efficiency gains from aggregating information from large numbers of investors is lost. There is little evidence of change overall in "state capture," based on three survey items.
Paying bribes "to influence the content of new legislation, rules or decrees" appears to be about equally common in both years. Similarly, the share of firms reporting a significant impact on their business from Parliamentarians receiving bribes to affect their votes is little changed. 28 A slight improvement is evident for a similar question on payments to Government officials to affect the content of government decrees.
Overall, Table 2 This overall progress also hides uneven progress across countries. Detailed country-bycountry results will be a focus of the forthcoming Anticorruption in Transition 3, but a few patterns will be discussed for comparisons with findings from other data sources. Table 4 shows the average change over time for the same four variables, and in parentheses shows ranks in terms of change (e.g. 1 improves the most, 27
worsens the most).
The multidimensionality of corruption is apparent from these tables, making valid generalizations difficult regarding statements for any simplistic conclusion that corruption is worse in country X than in country Y. Macedonia ranked 5 th in "bribe tax" in 2005, but 27 th on 28 The question does not specify whether the "private payments/gifts" to Parliamentarians were paid by the firm or by other firms, but simply refers to the "impact on your business" from such practices. 29 These four were selected from the larger set primarily for their prominent use in Gray, Hellman, and Ryterman (2004) . Several of the "state capture" variables they used were not included in the 2005 BEEPS; among the remaining state capture items Q44b was selected because firms cited it more frequently than Q44a (on payments to Parliamentarians), and it is correlated most highly with an overall index of the three state capture measures in the 2005 BEEPS.
corruption as an "obstacle" to doing business. Nations in Transit covers only 27 "transition" countries in ECA (Turkey is not included).
On its 1-7 Corruption scale, a 1 is the best possible rating and a 7 is the worst, with quarter-point increments allowed. Although the various data sources agree with each other -and with the BEEPS evidence -that corruption has tended to decline for ECA overall, there is less agreement concerning the countries in the region that experienced improvements. Among the expert-based assessments:
• In ICRG, the largest increases from 2002 to 2005 were for Russia and Serbia/Montenegro (both from 1 to 2 on the 0-6 scale). Czech Republic showed a decline from 3 to 2.5. Poland and Hungary were unchanged.
• In NIT, the only improvement of ½ point or greater were all in the Balkans:
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania. Poland and Belarus had the largest declines, of ¾ point. Czech Republic improved by ½ point, while Hungary improved 1.2 point.
• The CPIA, consistent with NIT, showed improvements in the Balkans, but also showed increases for Belarus and Tajikistan. Czech Republic increased by ½ point, while ratings were reduced for Hungary and Poland.
These changes appear to be inconsistent, perhaps sufficiently so to cast doubt on the argument that expert-based assessments consult each other's ratings, or are otherwise based on very similar information. The answer to this puzzle is that ratings changes in expert-based systems often do not necessarily reflect a belief that conditions have changed, but instead represent a correction to a previous year's rating that in retrospect appears too high or too low. If these examples of converging assessments are more the rule than the exception, one would expect inter-correlations among these expert sources to be higher in 2005 than in 2002. Table 7 confirms this pattern of increasing correlations among ICRG, NIT and CPIA. One would also expect the correlation across sources to strengthen, when initial values are held constant. Table 8 , column 1 shows no significant relationship between changes in ICRG and CPIA. Column 2 adds the initial CPIA rating (2002) as a control. The coefficient on ICRG increases by more than one half, and statistical significance improves from .38 to .05.
In summary, other sources tend to agree with evidence from the BEEPS that corruption in the region declined from 2002 to 2005. Although other sources often disagree with each other on which countries experienced improvement, part of this apparent disagreement results merely from converging assessments.
Do Broad Corruption Measures Reflect Administrative Corruption or State Capture?
The variety of corruption measures in the BEEPS and WEF surveys can be exploited to ascertain the aspects of corruption that are best captured by the broader, perception-based measures (including the BEEPS question on corruption as an obstacle to doing business). Table   9 reports correlations of NIT, ICRG, CPIA, the BEEPS "obstacle" question, and the TI index with a comprehensive set of corruption measures included in the BEEPS and WEF.
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The NIT and ICRG assessment criteria reflect a roughly equal mix of administrative corruption and state capture, while the CPIA criteria clearly place a greater emphasis on state capture. The correlations with BEEPS variables reported in Table 9 suggest that all three sources are stronger, and roughly equal in magnitude to those for most of the administrative corruption measures in the WEF.
A striking finding from the BEEPS and WEF data is the weak link between corruption in public procurement and the broad, perception-based measures. Neither of the two BEEPS variables on bribe paying to obtain public contracts, nor a similar measure in the WEF, are correlated with NIT, ICRG or CPIA ratings at better than .27.
Two WEF variables measure business executives' perceptions of other aspects of corruption that pertain less to state-enterprise interactions, and more to misappropriation of taxpayer funds by government officials. One of these is titled "diversion of public funds," and the other "public trust in the financial honesty of politicians." The criteria of NIT, ICRG and CPIA all pertain to these issues; in practice the ICRG appears to capture them better than NIT, which in turn reflects them more fully than the CPIA.
The dimensions of corruption that present the largest obstacles to doing business are of course likely to vary not only across countries, but also across firms within a country. Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2004) use BEEPS II data to run country-specific, cross-firm regressions of the "obstacle" measure on several variables, including a few on specific forms of administrative corruption. In some countries, bribes paid in dealing with courts is a significantly obstacle, while in others bribes paid to obtain business licenses are significant. Table 6 neither disaggregates by country, nor controls for other variables, so is a cruder look into what forms of corruption appear more often to represent a serious obstacle. With these caveats, the broad perceptions measure of corruption in BEEPS -the "obstacle" measure -is most closely related to the "state capture" questions, in stark contrast to the NIT, ICRG and CPIA. Among the BEEPS administrative corruption variables, only those on courts and customs/imports are correlated with the "obstacle" measure at more than .6. Correlations of the three "state capture"
variables with "obstacle" range from .62 to .73.
The same pattern does not emerge from the WEF variables: in general correlations of "obstacle" with the WEF administrative corruption and state capture variables are similar. A striking finding, however, is that "obstacle" is more highly correlated (.83) with the WEF "diversion of public funds" measure than with any of the BEEPS measures.
Correlations of the BEEPS and WEF variables with NIT, ICRG, CPIA and even with the BEEPS "obstacle" variable can help us see what information underlies subjective judgments regarding corruption. Correlations of TI with BEEPS and WEF, however, must be interpreted differently. The WEF administrative corruption variables are correlated by construction with the TI index. Not surprisingly, they are more strongly correlated with TI than are the other WEF variables, and all of the BEEPS variables, which are not components of TI. Because these WEF administrative corruption variables enter the TI index as three separate sources -for the three most recent annual surveys -the overall TI index is likely to emphasize administrative corruption more than state capture. Therefore, we can expect the administrative corruption measures in BEEPS to be more strongly correlated than the BEEPS state capture measures with TI, even though BEEPS is not a component of the TI index. That is in fact what we find in Table   9 . Correlations of TI with the three state capture variables range form .11 to .28. Correlations with TI exceed .40 for 7 of the 9 BEEPS administrative corruption measures, with the highest for tax collection (.66) and business licenses (.70).
Correlations with TI are lowest for the public procurement variables in BEEPS. To the extent that corrupt governments are identified and subject to pressure by donor agencies, NGOs or voters using the well-known perceptions indicators -not only TI, but also NIT, ICRG or CPIA -corrupt officials are best advised to seek bribes through public contracts, which appears to go largely unmeasured by those sources.
Factor analysis is an alternative approach for analyzing the content of broad corruption indicators. A factor analysis of 12 BEEPS variables yields two significant factors (eigenvalues exceeding one) that together explaining 85% of the variation in the data. One of these is identifiable as a "state capture" factor: the three variables on unofficial payments to influence legislation and rules all load most heavily on it (Q41j, Q44a, Q44b). The second factor reflects administrative corruption: variables loading most heavily on it include payments to obtain business licenses (Q41b), to deal with fire and building inspections (Q41e), and to deal with taxes and tax collection (Q41g).
When the NIT corruption measure is added as a 13 th variable in the factor analysis, it has a large positive loading on the administrative corruption factor, but a small negative loading on the state capture factor. In other words, based on the various aspects of corruption measured by the BEEPS, NIT appears to be measuring mostly administrative corruption. Very similar results are found if instead of NIT, the 13 th variable added is the CPIA, ICRG, TI, WBI, or the "obstacle" measure from BEEPS.
Factor analyses of 9 WEF variables, instead of BEEPS variables, produce very similar findings. Two significant factors -again clearly identifiable as administrative corruption and state capture -explain 95% of the variation. Corruption measures from NIT, CPIA, TI and WBI all load mostly on the administrative corruption factor when any one of them is added as a 10 th variable. The ICRG and the "obstacle" measure from BEEPS, load more equally across the two factors (although still more strongly on administrative corruption than on state capture).
The weak link between state capture measures in BEEPS and in broader perceptionsbased indicators is due in part to Belarus and Uzbekistan. These two countries are "outliers" in being rated lower by external sources than in most BEEPS indicators, particularly those on state capture. 35 Omitting them, correlations of NIT and CPIA with the BEEPS state capture measures (and with its "obstacle" measure) rise substantially. However, neither Belarus nor Uzbekistan are included in the WEF sample, so none of the correlations reported in the lower part of Table 9 change when they are deleted. Moreover, the factor analysis using WEF data showed that NIT, CPIA, ICRG, TI and WBI were mostly measuring administrative corruption rather than state capture.
Summary
The BEEPS and other sources of corruption data indicate that corruption in ECA overall is declining. The sources appear to differ somewhat on the magnitude of this decline, with the BEEPS perhaps exhibiting a particularly favorable trend. Discrepancies in magnitudes do not necessarily indicate inaccuracy in one or more sources, however, because of differences in the with levels -may be explained by differences in how different sources define corruption. As Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2000: 50) conclude from the BEEPS I and II data: "One cannot simply say that corruption is going up or down in individual countries, as we find a complex web of movements and mutations across different forms, features and dimensions of corruption. We need to be cautious and modest and to constantly recognize the full complexity of the measurement effort." Gray, Hellman and Ryterman (2000: 40) More research is also needed inquiring into the actual content of commonly-used indicators, as distinct from their purported content. The criteria for several sources, including ICRG, CPIA, and NIT, place great weight on "state capture," but appear to be measuring primarily administrative corruption. Evidence in this paper is based solely on the ECA region, but this issue could be examined using the full WEF sample.
The conceptual and methodological discussions, as well as empirical evidence reported here form BEEPS and other sources, strongly support the message that no single, nor one source of data on corruption, is most appropriate for all purposes. Expert ratings are too vaguely and broadly defined, and constructed too non-transparently, to be suitable for some purposes. For example, it is difficult to make governments responsible for improving their ratings on such measures, as a condition for receiving aid -because there is little indication of what specific reforms a government could implement that is likely to improve its ratings.
In comparison to broad expert assessments, the BEEPS has several advantages -most notably its large set of items that "unbundled" corruption, and the fact that firm-level analyses are possible -but it "provides a very incomplete measurement of corruption" (Gray, Hellman, and Ryterman, 2000: 54) by measuring only state-enterprise interactions.
To improve on the existing set of country-level corruption indicators, more data collection is needed on several margins. First, the BEEPS should be replicated for each of the other regions. Second, firm surveys should be complemented by more systematic household surveys measuring experiences with corruption and other governance problems. Transparency Aggregated indexes of corruption, to the extent their conceptual breadth makes them appropriate for some purposes, should be used with more caution by development agencies.
There should be more examination of the criteria and methods of their underlying sources, to better understand what they are measuring. Depending on one's purposes, customized indexes based on a subset of the TI, or WBI, components might be more appropriate. Similarly, the weights used by TI and WBI are essentially arbitrary, particularly when it is acknowledged that many of the data sources are highly interdependent. If the underlying data were made more accessible, data users could choose the weights they deem appropriate for their purposes, in customizing an index. Proportions as defined in Table 3 are reported for bribe frequency, state capture and corruption as an obstacle. This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political process.
The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.
Although our measure takes such corruption into account, it is more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-forfavors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. In our view these insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.
The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, as to provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering the country ungovernable. 
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Irregular payments in exports and imports
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with export and import permits? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs)
Irregular payments public utilities
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes when getting connected to public utilities? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs)
Irregular payments in tax collection
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with annual tax payments? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs)
Irregular payments in public contracts
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with public contracts (investment projects)? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs)
Irregular payments in judicial decisions
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with getting favorable judicial decisions? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs)
Business costs of corruption Do other firms' illegal payments to influence government policies, laws or regulations impose costs or otherwise negatively affect your firm? (1 = impose large costs, 7 = impose no costs/not relevant)
Favoritism in decisions of government officials
When deciding upon policies and contracts, government officials (1 = usually favor wellconnected firms and individuals, 7 = are neutral among firms and individuals)
Diversion of public funds
In your country, diversion of public funds to companies, individuals or groups due to corruption (1 = is common, 7 = never occurs)
Public trust of politicians
Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians is (1 = very low, 7 = very high)
Figure 1 
